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General Electric Co. v. Liffon Industrial
Automation Systems, Inc.: Are Attorney Fees
Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost
Recovery Actions?
General Electric (GE) purchased a forty acre plot (the site)
in Springfield, Missouri from Litton Industries, Inc.' Subse-
quently, GE contracted to sell nineteen acres of the site to En-
terprise Park, a real estate concern that planned to develop the
property for commercial use.2 The plan stalled, however, when
the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) dis-
covered that the owner of the site before Litton had dumped
cyanide-based electroplating wastes, sludges, and other pollu-
tants at the site.3 Under threat of legal action from Enterprise
Park,4 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
MDNR, GE began its cleanup of the site.5
1. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1416 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991). Litton acquired the
site in 1965, when it merged with the previous owner, Royal McBee Corpora-
tion. Id. at 1416 n.3. Royal McBee had operated a typewriter plant on the site
beginning in 1959. Id. Litton sold the site to General Electric in 1970. Id.
2. Id GE contracted to sell the site to Enterprise Park in 1985. Id.
3. Id. The Royal McBee Typewriter Company had dumped wastes at the
site from 1959 to 1962. Id.
4. Id. at 1417. In July 1985, when the MDNR placed the site on the
state's Registry of Abandoned and Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites of
Missouri, Enterprise Park notified both GE and Litton that it intended to file
CERCLA claims. Id. at 1416.
5. Id. at 1416-17. The facts are slightly more complex. In 1980, the Mis-
souri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) learned that wastes had
been dumped at the site by Royal McBee Corp. in the early 1960s. Id. at 1416.
The MDNR and GE jointly concluded in 1981 that the dumping posed no dan-
gers of groundwater contamination. Id. In 1984, GE contracted to sell the site
to Enterprise Park. Id In 1985, the EPA, motivated by findings made by an-
other state health agency, the Missouri Department of Health (MDOH), de-
clared the results of the 1981 study erroneous, and ordered Missouri to enforce
the site's cleanup. Id. at 1416-17. In December, 1985, GE entered into a settle-
ment with Enterprise Park under which GE agreed to assume liability for the
cleanup. Id at 1417. In early 1986, GE, the MDNR, and Enterprise Park en-
tered into a Consent Decree providing for the development and implementa-
tion of a cleanup plan for the site. Id. The Consent Decree required any
cleanup to be "consistent with the National Contingency Plan," EPA
Superfund programs, and required MDNR approval of all actions. Id. GE
hired an independent contractor, OH Materials Company, to investigate
cleanup options. Id. GE chose excavation as the most effective response ac-
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GE brought suit against Litton under the CERCLA6 stat-
ute to recover its response costs7 for cleaning up the site and
the attorney fees it incurred in bringing the claim.8 The federal
district court ordered Litton to pay GE $940,000 as reimburse-
ment for cleanup costs.9 The court also ruled that CERCLA
permits plaintiffs to recover attorney fees and ordered Litton to
pay GE $419,000 in attorney fees and expenses.'0 In December
1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision."
General Electric raises the question of whether private
plaintiffs may recover attorney fees in cost recovery actions
under CERCLA. Attorney fees sometimes exceed cleanup
costs' 2 and therefore assume vast importance in private cost re-
covery actions.' 3 Until the Eighth Circuit's decision in General
Electric, however, no federal appellate court had ruled on the
validity of awarding attorney fees in a private cost recovery ac-
tion, although it was the most costly method suggested by OH Materials. I
Excavation began at the site on October 13, 1986, and continued at selected in-
tervals until completed in December 1987. I& During the course of the
cleanup, GE unearthed four large drums, one of which contained "extremely
hazardous substances." Id. GE disposed of the drums and the contaminated
soil as hazardous waste. Id- In early 1988, the MDNR approved the cleanup of
the site. I&
The United States District Court awarded GE $940,843.23 for the cost of
the cleanup. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949,
963 (W.D. Mo. 1989), qf'd sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Auto-
mation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697
(1991). The court subdivided the amount into $84,182.39 on the initial study,
$5,100 in "utility costs," and $851,560.84 for the cleanup. Id.
6. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
7. General Elec., 715 F. Supp. at 952.
8. IH at 958-59.
9. I&
10. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1417.
11. I& at 1416.
12. The Eighth Circuit noted that "[tihe litigation costs could easily ap-
proach or even exceed the response costs. .. ." Id. at 1422. The cleanup proce-
dures mandated by the SARA amendments to CERCLA "would drive the cost
of a superfund cleanup from its present average of $9 million per site to be-
tween $30 million and $60 million per site." 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 778-79 (Sept.
26, 1986). When long term costs, such as groundwater cleanup, are included,
the cost estimate rises to between $300 million and $600 million. Id. The com-
pletion of the Superfund program is estimated to cost as much as $100 billion.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2838 [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
13. See General Flea, 920 F.2d at 1417. GE's attorney fees, at $419,000,
were nearly half its response costs, which totalled over $940,000. Id.
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tion.14 Because of the lack of other appellate case law on the
issue, the General Electric decision likely will reverberate
through all CERCLA litigation as the highest judicial word on
attorney fees. Further, its allowance of attorney fees will en-
courage defendants either to settle their claims instead of liti-
gating, to settle on less favorable terms, or to risk huge
penalties should they lose at trial.15
This Comment argues that General Electric is inconsistent
with prior law and ignores important statutory language and
policy arguments. Part I traces the development of attorney
fees and CERCLA cost recovery action jurisprudence. Part 11
describes the holding and reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's
General Electric opinion. Part III critiques the General Electric
opinion and argues that the Eighth Circuit failed to consider
crucial arguments based on CERCLA's statutory language and
underlying policies. Finally, this Comment proposes an inter-
pretation that respects the statutory text and better satisfies
the objectives of CERCLA.
I. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER CERCLA
A. THE AMERICAN RULE
The American Rule requires each party to bear its own
costs of litigation, including attorney fees.'6 The rule differs
from the traditional English practice of awarding attorney fees
to the prevailing party.17 Despite vigorous scholarly criticism, 8
14. rd- at 1422 n.10.
15. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. Defendant Litton's at-
torney Bruce Kauffman, of the Philadelphia firm Dilworth, Paxson, Kalish &
Kauffman, commented that the court's decision will have "'consequences
more dramatic than the court recognizes... [and] will encourage a great deal
of this litigation' that otherwise may not have been brought." 54 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 885, 885 (Dec. 24, 1990).
16. The American Rule was purportedly established in Arcambel v. Wise-
man, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796). The Supreme Court noted in Arcambel
that "[tihe general practice of the United States is in opposition to [the award-
ing of attorney fees]; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in prin-
ciple, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute." Id For a discussion on the American Rule's origins, see Leubsdorf,
Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 15 (1984).
17. The English practice of awarding attorney fees to successful plaintiffs
dates to 1278. Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 1. The current practice
in England is to conduct hearings before special "taxing masters" to determine
an appropriate award of attorney fees. See Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202, 204-05 (1966). A ma-
jority of other nations with litigation systems similar to that of the United
1991] 1543
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the Supreme Court has upheld the rule on numerous occa-
sions,19 defending it with three principal rationales. 20 First, be-
cause the outcome of most litigation is uncertain, parties should
not be penalized simply for participating in a lawsuit.21 In addi-
tion, an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party might dis-
courage the poor from instituting suit.22 Finally, the added
administrative and financial expense involved in determining
the amount of attorney fees would excessively burden the judi-
cial system.23
Because of the American Rule's arguably harsh effects,24
both common law2 5 and statutory exceptions long have existed
States allow some amount of fee shifting. However, foreign practice could re-
flect substantial differences in legal costs, predictability of outcome, and legal
culture. For a broader discussion of European practice, see Pfennigstorf, The
European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
37, 55-59 (1984).
18. See McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Erpenses of Litigation as an
Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 638-43 (1931); Note, Promoting the
Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Award Act, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 346, 348 (1980); Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in Environmental Lit-
igation" Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate"Standard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 312
n.25 (1984) (citing Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 792-94 (1966)); Comment, Court Awarded Attor-
ney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 648-55 (1974).
19. See e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
269-71 (1975); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-9 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167
(1939).
20. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id,
24. See supra note 18.
25. Courts have used their inherent equity powers to fashion two broad
exceptions to the American Rule: the bad faith exception and the common
fund or common benefit exception. Courts invoke the bad faith exception to
punish litigants who abuse the judicial process by acting in "bad faith, vexa-
tiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex
rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). See generally Comment,
Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HAsTiNGs L.J. 319
(1977) (discussing bad faith exception). During the 1960s, courts expanded the
bad faith exception to include instances where defendants had not directly
abused the judicial process, but simply refused to comply with a federal stat-
ute, forcing a private citizen to institute legal proceedings to vindicate her con-
stitutional or statutory rights. See Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th
Cir. 1963).
Courts used the common fund exception not to punish evil litigants, but to
prevent unjust enrichment. The exception rested on the belief that "persons
who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its costs are un-
justly enriched at the successful litigant's expense." Boeing Co. v. Van
1544 [Vol. 75:1541
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to the Rule.26 In addition to these traditional exceptions, courts
before 1975 occasionally awarded fees on the "private attorney
general" rationale.- In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society,23 however, the Supreme Court resoundingly re-
jected the practice of awarding fees in the absence of statutory
authorization.2 9 After Alyeska, courts will award attorney fees
in statutorily-based causes of action only if the common law al-
lows fees30 or if a statute specifically authorizes them.31 Con-
gress reacted to Alyeskca by passing a series of explicitly worded
fee provisions in statutes concerning such areas, including civil
rights and the environment. 32 In addition, Congress passed the
Equal Access to Justice Act, which allows private plaintiffs to
Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). Courts addressed the problem by permitting
a fee award to a plaintiff who successfully sued to protect a fund in which he
and others had a common monetary interest. Id. For the origin of the "com-
mon fund" doctrine, see Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1881).
26. Over 100 federal statutes authorize fee awards. For a list of these stat-
utes, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. The rationale behind the 'private attorney general" doctrine was that
the plaintiff acted as a private attorney general, vindicating public rights.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Courts applied the
doctrine most commonly in civil rights cases, where successful plaintiffs argua-
bly benefitted large classes of similarly situated persons and furthered public
policies. Id&
28. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
29. Id. at 269-71.
30. Few of the traditional common law exceptions have much general ap-
plication today. Courts may award fees if a contract calls for payment of attor-
ney fees to the fee claimant. See, eg., Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. "Hermes," 765
F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985) (dicta). In addition, courts may award attorney fees
as an item of damages in malicious prosecution suits. See, eg., Kerr v. City of
Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134, 1141 (7th Cir. 1970) (allowing civil rights plaintiff to
recover attorney fees incurred in a wrongful criminal prosecution). Last,
when a defendant's tortious conduct or breach of contract causes the plaintiff
to litigate with a third party, the defendant may be liable for attorney fees
generated. See, ag., Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Costa, 789 F.2d
83, 88-90 (1st Cir. 1986). However, the primary reasons a court may grant a fee
award today remain litigant misconduct, the common fund exception, and an
authorizing statute. See Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries:
Introducing the Problem, 1986 DuKE L.J. 435, 439-45.
31. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-71
(1975); see Dobbs, supra note 30, at 439. A few states, including California and
Minnesota, still make fee awards under state law on the private attorney gen-
eral rationale. See Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 38-48, 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-
15, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 420-27 (1977); Senior Citizens Coalition v. Minnesota
Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 355 N.W.2d 295, 302 n.10 (Minn. 1984).
32. See, ag., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988) (citizen suit provision allowing at-
torney fee recovery for commencing suit to protect an endangered species); 42
U.S.C. § 5412(b) (1988) (Manufactured Home Standards provision allowing at-
torney fee recovery to plaintiff suing noncomplying builders); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6971(c) (1988) (Solid Waste Disposal Act provision allowing attorney fee re-
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recover attorney fees in all actions brought under a federal
statute against the United States.33
B. PRIVATE COST RECOVERY ACrIONS UNDER CERCLA
Sensing heightened public anxiety over improper hazard-
ous waste disposals4 and concerned about the lack of common
law remedies for toxic waste damage,35 Congress passed the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)6 in 1980. Congress equipped CER-
CLA with a wide array of remedies to deal with hazardous
dumpsites, including injunctive relief against active polluters
and strict liability for waste discharge; in addition, Congress al-
lowed innocent private and government plaintiffs to recover
costs expended in cleanups.- 7 Due to its hasty passage, CER-
covery for whistleblowing employees). All these sections provide explicitly for
attorney fees.
33. The principal exception to the American Rule is the Equal Access to
Justice Act, which authorizes the recovery of attorney fees in actions brought
against the United States under any statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988).
Significantly, the Act will not apply to most cost recovery actions, because the
government is usually not the defendant. The Act allows a prevailing plaintiff
who is either an individual whose net worth is less than $2 million, or a corpo-
ration whose net worth is less than $7 million to collect attorney fees from the
United States in a suit where the court finds the government's position is not
substantially justified. See Carbone, The Misguided Application of the Tradi-
tional Fee Doctrine to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 26 B.C.L. REV. 843, 872-
73 (1985).
34. In 1976, the Love Canal disaster in Niagara Falls, New York, brought
national recognition to the hazards of improper waste disposal. 1 A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSA-
TION, AND LiABrY Acr OF 1980, at 700 (M. Reisch ed. 1983). In 1977, Senator
Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, responding to public outrage, began a
study of the problem that culminated in congressional passage of CERCLA.
Id.
35. See generally Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic
Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981) (discussing inade-
quacies of pre-CERCLA common law remedies for toxic waste caused dam-
age); Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste" The Failure of
Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1058-65 (1981) (discuss-
ing common law remedies for toxic waste damage); Comment, Superfund:
Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9 EcOLOGY L.Q.
524, 532-35 (1981) (discussing pre-CERCLA common law remedies for toxic
waste damage).
36. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
37. CERCLA mandates the reporting of any release of a hazardous sub-
stance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9603 (1988). The Act empowers the President to take
all necessary steps to effect the disposal and removal of hazardous waste. Id.
§ 9604. CERCLA goes so far as to authorize the permanent relocation of indi-
1546
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CLA is rife with ambiguities 3s that provide a fertile source of
litigation.
CERCLA contains dual remedies for the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste and the corresponding allocation of "response
costs."39 First, CERCLA established the Superfund,4° which
provides financial resources for governmental response to those
hazardous waste sites deemed to create the most imminent
threat to public health.41 In addition, CERCLA allows govern-
mental entities and parties faced with the cleanup of a hazard-
ous situation to recover the costs of the operation from the
polluters.42
CERCLA provides for two distinct causes of action
whereby plaintiffs may recover their cleanup expenditures. A
state or local government, or the EPA may sue a polluting
party under section 107(a)(4)(A) for cleanup costs.43 Alterna-
viduals when a health assessment shows a significant risk of health danger
through exposure to a toxic substance. Id. § 9604(i)(11). See generally 1A F.
GRAD, TREATISE ON ENViRONmENTAL LAw § 4A.02(1) (1990) (discussing nu-
merous avenues of relief provided by CERCLA).
38. See generally F. GRAD, supra note 37, § 4A.02(2)(a) (discussing hurried
manner in which Congress passed CERCLA). CERCLA was considered on
December 3, 1980, "in the closing days of the lame duck session of an outgoing
Congress." Id. It was passed after a limited debate, and under a rules suspen-
sion allowing for no amendments. Id Thus, "[flaced with a complicated bill
on a take-it or leave it basis, the House took it, groaning all the way." Id. The
draft eventually adopted did not undergo technical revisions due to sponsors'
fears that any delay would destroy the wavering coalition that supported its
passage. See id- § 4A.02(2)(g).
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9611 (1988) (Congress provided Superfund with
governmental cleanup and liability provisions for private cleanup costs alloca-
tion). "Response costs" is simply CERCLA's term for costs incurred in a
cleanup. I& § 9601(25).
40. I& § 9611(p). The Hazardous Substance Response Fund, commonly
called the "Superfund," originally allocated $1.6 billion in federal funds to fi-
nance government cleanup of hazardous substances. Bulk Distrib. Centers,
Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
41. See supra note 40.
42. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) is central to enforcement of CERCLA. It provides
for the assignment of liability to clearly designated classes of persons. These
persons are:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated a facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of;
(3) any person who by contract or agreement or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
1991] 1547
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tively, a private party may sue a responsible party under sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B) for cleanup costs that the private party has
incurred.44 The latter is termed a "private cost recovery
action."45
CERCLA specifically permits the federal government to
recover its attorney fees incurred in enforcement actions.4
Private plaintiffs, however, may recover "necessary" costs of
response consistent with the National Contingency Plan.47 Be-
cause of the language's ambiguity, it remains unclear whether
private parties may recover attorney fees under the rubric of
"necessary response costs."'4 8
C. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN PRIVATE COST
RECOVERY ACTIONS: DIVIDED COURTS
Until General Electric, no Circuit Court of Appeals had ad-
dressed the issue of whether CERCLA permits prevailing pri-
vate litigants to recover their attorney fees.49 Those federal
district courts that addressed the issue were split. More than
half of the district courts faced with the attorney fees issue
held that attorney fees are per se unrecoverable as private liti-
gant response costs.50 The remaining courts held, as in General
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by an-
other party or entity and containing such hazardous substances
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport for disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or
threatened release of a hazardous substance which causes the in-
currence of response costs.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
44. I& § 9607(a)(4)(B).
45. Id.; see also New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 615-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (explaining definition and procedural requirements of private
cost recovery action).
46. CERCLA provides, in pertinent part: "[Tihe President may undertake
such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and other
studies or investigations as he may deem necessary or appropriate to plan and
direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof, and to enforce the provi-
sions of this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1988).
47. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B); see also infra note 76 (describing National Contin-
gency Plan).
48. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
n.10, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
50. See New York v. SCA Servs., 754 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990); Fal-
lowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23,
1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57,
1548 [Vol. 75:1541
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Electric, that private litigants may recover attorney fees.51
Only one federal district court took a middle approach, holding
that attorne3f fees are partially recoverable to the extent that
they correspond to congressional intent behind the statutory
definition of "response costs."5 2 These courts have differed in
their interpretation of CERCLA's statutory language, legisla-
tive silence, and the policies underlying CERCLA's private cost
recovery action provisions.
1. Malleable Statutory Language: Definition of Response
Costs
Section 101(25) defines "response costs" to include "rem-
edy, remedial action, all such terms... includ[ing] enforcement
activities related thereto."' Congress amended section 101 in
1986 to include the italicized language,s 4 and the section, which
provides definitions for the entire Act, applies to both govern-
ment and private plaintiffs.ss A number of courts have in-
62-63 (D.N.H. 1990); Regan v. Cherry, 706 F. Supp. 145, 150 (D.R.I. 1989); T &
E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 (D.N.J. 1988); Juniper
Dev. Group v. Kalm (In re Hemingway Transport), 108 B.R. 378, 378 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1989).
51. Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 949-52
(C.D. Cal. 1990); Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 958-59
(W.D. Mo 1989), a-f'd sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation
Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991); Ly-
kins v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 18 E.L.R. 21498, 21500 (E.D. Ky. 1988)
(dicta).
52. BCW Assoc. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 86-5947, slip op. at 12-15
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 29,1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988) (emphasis added).
54. Congress realized soon after the passage of CERCLA that toxic wastes
posed a greater problem than they had anticipated in 1980, and accordingly en-
acted a five year amended extension of the CERCLA program, the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (amending various sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)). SARA provided an additional $8.5 billion for the fund. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (1988). The new fund was called the Hazardous Substances Superfund,
and it is a continuation of the Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund es-
tablished by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, § 221, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 280, repealed by Act of
Oct. 17, 1986, § 517(c)(7), 100 Stat. 1774. SARA also attempted to provide a
more equitable distribution of cleanup responsibility. See Note, Misery Loves
Company: Spreading the Costs of CERCLA Cleanup, 42 VAN1. L. REV. 1469,
1471-73 (1989). SARA created an innocent landowner defense to liability. 42
U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (1988). SARA also provided for a right to contribution
for potentially responsible parties. Id. § 9613(f)(1).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988) is the "Definitions" section of the CERCLA
Act, and, as such, presumptively applies to the entire Act.
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cluded attorney fees in a plain meaning interpretation of
"enforcement activities."5' One court reasoned that any other
construction of "enforcement activities," would render the
phrase meaningless,5 7 because the enforcement role of private
parties under CERCLA is limited to bringing suits to compel
cleanup and recover costs.-s
Other courts have rejected this construction of the statute,
holding that the 1986 addition of the "enforcement activities"
language to CERCLA merely clarifies the EPA's authority to
recover its legal fees and enforcement costs.59 In addition,
these courts posit that a private cost recovery action is not an
"enforcement action," because only the government can "en-
force" a statute; hence, private plaintiffs do not incur "enforce-
ment costs" as contemplated in CERCLA.60
Some courts have denied recovery of attorney fees by pri-
vate parties on the premise that, had Congress wanted private
parties to recover attorney fees, it could have authorized such
recovery explicitly in the language of CERCLA.61 For exam-
ple, section 104 of the Act specifically allows the President or
the EPA to recover its attorney fees. Section 310, added in the
1986 amendments, authorizes private citizen suit plaintiffs who
bring actions to compel the government to perform its
mandatory duties under CERCLA6 2 to recover attorney fees.6a
56. Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 950-51
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
57. Id. at 951.
58. Id.
59. Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
60. Id. The Fallowftield court based its decision in part on the earlier
holding to this effect in T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp.
696, 707-08 (D.N.J. 1988).
61. As the court noted in Regan v. Cherry, 706 F. Supp. 145 (D.R.I. 1989),
"[i]f Congress had intended to permit citizens seeking response costs to re-
cover their attorney fees, it would have simply amended sec. 107 to allow the
recovery of these litigation costs." Ia at 149; accord Fallowjfeld, slip op. at 5-
6; T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 707-08.
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1988). Citizen suits are undertaken by private
plaintiffs to "protect human health and the environment or both." H.R. REP.,
supra note 12, pt. 5, at 81, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 3204. Congress installed the citizen suit provision in recognition that before
1986, only CERCLA and the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) did not contain such provisions. Id. at 83, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3206. Congress sought to encourage two main
purposes with the citizen suit provision, namely, "encouraging diligent Federal
enforcement of environmental statutes" and "locating and taking actions
against violators of these Acts." Id,
63. Regan, 706 F. Supp. at 150. 42 U.S.C. § 9659, the CERCLA citizen's
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There is no corresponding provision in section 107, the provi-
sion that allows private plaintiffs to bring cost recovery ac-
tions.64 Focusing on this legislative silence, a number of courts
have concluded that such silence, by negative implication, sug-
gests that a private party may not recover attorney fees.65
These courts emphasize that when Congress thoroughly over-
hauled CERCLA in the 1986 amendments, it easily could have
inserted an explicit provision authorizing courts to award attor-
ney fees in private cost recovery actions.66 In addition, courts
denying recovery of attorney fees have focused on section 107's
different language when describing costs the government and
private parties may recover. For example, the federal govern-
ment, or a state, can recover "all costs.., not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan"'67 under section 107(a)(4)(A). In
contrast, private plaintiffs can recover only "necessary costs of
response ... consistent with the national contingency plan"' 8
under section 107(a)(4)(B). Thus, Congress may have intended
to allow private plaintiffs a more narrow measure of recovery
than the government.69
suit provision, permits a plaintiff to recover attorney fees in an action brought
against EPA to perform a mandatory duty.under CERCLA. It provides, in
pertinent part: "(f) Costs. The court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including rea-
sonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or the substantially
prevailing party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (1988).
64. Regan, 706 F. Supp. at 150; see also Appellant's Brief at 42, General
Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990)
(No. 89-2845), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
65. Reply Brief of Defendants at 2, Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No.
89-8644, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
66. Regan v. Cherry, 706 F. Supp. 145, 149-50 (D.R.I. 1989). The court in
Began noted
Plaintiffs' argument is unconvincing. If Congress had intended to per-
mit citizens seeking response costs to recover their attorney fees, it
would simply have amended sec. 107 to allow the recovery of these lit-
igation costs. SARA was a comprehensive overhaul of CERCLA.
Therefore, it would have been a simply [sic] matter to amend sec. 107
to allow recovery of attorney fees.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
68. I& § 9607(a)(4)(B).
69. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 14, Pease &
Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 89-
4468). "In short, Congress clearly intended to restrict the scope of a private
plaintiff's recovery under § 107. Attorney's fees are not 'necessary' response
costs and therefore should not be recoverable." I&. Defendants made the
identical argument in Fallowfwld:
If Congress intended private litigants to be able to recover their attor-
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2. Policy Rationales
A number of courts have reasoned that Congress passed
CERCLA to achieve broad remedial goals, and that awarding
attorney fees to prevailing plaintiffs furthers these purposes. 7
0
These courts contend that awarding attorney fees advances the
principal goals of CERCLA, namely "the prompt clean-up of
hazardous waste sites and the imposition of all costs of respond-
ing to the waste on the responsible party."' 71 Furthermore, if
courts refuse to award attorney fees, they may discourage pri-
vate parties who cannot bear large litigation costs from bring-
ing cost recovery actions. 72 Indeed, courts have hinted that
such a refusal might discourage hazardous waste defendants
from negotiating settlements, knowing that the threat of pro-
tracted litigation will discourage plaintiffs from pressing their
claims.73
ney's fees under CERCLA, it would have included that item of relief
in the definition of response costs. Instead, it made a reasonable dis-
tinction allowing the EPA to recover a broader measure of damages
under CERCLA than private litigants.
Reply Brief of Defendants at 2, Fallowfield (No. 89-8644).
70. Pease & Curren, 744 F. Supp. at 957; General Elec. Co. v. Litton Busi-
ness Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949, 959 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd sub nom, General
Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
71. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 46, General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus.
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2845), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
72. Id. GE argued that "[i]t would be counterproductive to [CERCLA's]
goals to discourage voluntary private responses by forcing parties to bear their
own attorney fees, which often can be a significant portion of response costs."
Id.; see, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Com-
ment, Financial Barriers to Litigatio: Attorney Fees and the Problem of
Legal Access, 46 ALBANY L. REv. 148, 160 (1981) (discussing the need for attor-
ney fee provisions to. enable indigent claimants to bring suit).
73. See supra note 72. GE argued on appeal in front of the Eighth Circuit
that "[ilt is also counterproductive to CERCLA's goals to encourage parties
who disposed of hazardous wastes (such as Litton) to litigate every conceivable
issue in a cost recovery action, secure in the knowledge that the only risk they
face is the need to pay clean-up costs if their defense is unsuccessful." Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellee at 46, General Elec. (No. 89-2845); see also Lyden v. Hower-
ton, 731 F. Supp. 1545, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (discussing similar rationale be-
hind the attorney fees provision in the EAJA). See, for example,
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711 (1986), where
the Court notes that "whatever the risk of winning or losing in a specific case
might be, a fee award should be informed by the statutory purpose of making
it possible for poor clients with good claims to secure competent help." I& at
730-31.
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I1. GENERAL ELECTRIC: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S
OPINION
General Electric represents the first United States Court of
Appeals decision on whether a private party may recover attor-
ney fees under CERCLA. Before deciding the attorney fees is-
sue, the Eighth Circuit addressed a number of preliminary
issues. First, the General Electric court found that Litton
caused General Electric to incur response costs.74 Litton failed
to satisfy any of the narrowly drawn statutory defenses.75
Next, the court held that General Electric's response actions
were consistent with the National Contingency Plan.76 The
Eighth Circuit rejected Litton's argument that GE claimed non-
74. General Ele , 920 F.2d at 1418. Litton argued that General Electric
cleaned up the site to avoid suit from Enterprise Park, with which it had con-
tracted to sell the land. I& at 1417-18. Thus, the desire to avoid suit, and not
Litton's release "caused" the cleanup. Id- at 1418. The Eighth Circuit rejected
this unlikely argument, noting that CERCLA prescribes strict liability for par-
ties who effect a release, subject only to statutorily enumerated defenses. I&.
Litton had "effected" the release because it had merged with Royal McBee,
the corporation who actually dumped waste on the property. Id. at 1417-18.
75. Id. at 1418. A CERCLA defendant's only statutory defenses require
the defendant to prove affirmatively that the release was caused wholly by (1)
an act of god; (2) an act of war, or (3) a third party whose actions were not
foreseeable by the defendant, who exercised due care with regard to the haz-
ardous substance. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). In addition, the third party must
not have been an agent or employee of the defendant, or have entered into a
contractual relationship with the defendant. Id. Thus, a majority of courts do
not recognize equitable defenses to CERCLA liability. See, e.g., United States
v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp 1053, 1061-62 (C.D. Cal. 1987). But see United
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626-29 (D.N.H. 1989) (holding equitable de-
fenses not precluded, but refusing to find estoppel, or release and waiver).
76. General Elea, 920 F.2d at 1418-20. EPA compiles a list of all hazard-
ous waste dumps, termed the National Priorities List, as part of the National
Contingency Plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(b) (1988). EPA evaluates the
dump sites on a set of enumerated criteria to determine the threat each site
poses to the public. Id EPA then creates a timetable for the clean up of the
sites. Id In order to reach this question, the court had to make a preliminary
determination classifying the cleanup as either a remedial or removal action.
General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1419-20. A remedial action involves a permanent so-
lution to a hazardous waste problem. Id A removal action is intended as a
temporary measure. Id Despite the permanent nature of the response in this
case, the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that GE conducted a
removal action. I&.
The court found that GE had excavated the site, and further noted that
"excavation" is included within the enumerated list of "remedial action" activ-
ities under CERCLA § 101(24), and not under the similar list for "removal ac-
tions" listed under § 101(23). Id. at 1420. Although the cleanup was
permanent, it took little over a year and did not seem too time consuming to
be a remedial action. Id
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necessary expenses as "necessary costs of response." 77
Although the court recognized that GE's cleanup had the added
effect of making the site available for sale, it found no evidence
that GE made excessive improvements unrelated to compliance
with the state-imposed toxic chemical standards.78
On the issue of GE's demand for attorney fees, Litton ar-
gued that CERCLA did not contain the explicit congressional
authorization required under Alyeska 79 for a court to award at-
torney fees to a prevailing party.80 The Eight Circuit rejected
this assertion, relying on the language in CERCLA that allows
a plaintiff to recover "necessary costs of response."8' Noting
that CERCLA section 101(25) defines "response" to include
"enforcement activities related thereto,"8 2 the court held that
private parties' lawsuits amount to enforcement activities under
CERCLA.8 3 In analyzing the statutory language, the Eighth
Circuit stated that "it would strain the statutory language to
the breaking point to read [attorney fees] out of the 'necessary
costs' that section 107(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to re-
cover." 4 Significantly, the Eighth Circuit did not examine the
legislative history of section 107(a)(4)(B) in its opinion.ss Fi-
nally, the court reasoned that its holding would further the
public policy goals of a prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites
and the imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible
77. Id. at 1421. Litton argued that GE incurred some of its claimed costs
of response in improving the property simply to increase the profit on its sale.
Id. The court began by remarking that GE's cleanup had to comport with
state-imposed standards, which had been promulgated by the Missouri Depart-
ment of Natural Resources ("MDNR"). Id. MDNR supervised the cleanup at
all stages and eventually pronounced the site "clean" in 1987. Id The court
recognized further that compliance with the MDNR standards was "neces-
sary" within the meaning of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B). Id-
78. Id.
79. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269-71
(1975).
80. General Elec., 920 F.2d at 1421. The court cited Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 185 (1976), for this proposition. The court also noted language in
Runyon stating that authorizing language must amount to more than "genera-
lized commands." Id. (quoting Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186). The court concluded
that there "must be a clear expression of Congress' intent" for attorney fees to
be awarded. Id.
81. I& at 1421-22.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing Cadillac/Fairview v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th
Cir. 1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir.
1986)).
84. Id- at 1422.
85. Id- at 1421-22.
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parties.sm
III. ATTORNEY FEES IN PRIVATE COST RECOVERY
ACTIONS AND CERCLA'S LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND POLICIES
The Alyeska court held that a plaintiff cannot recover at-
torney fees in a statutory cause of action absent statutory au-
thorization.81 A standard method of interpreting a statute to
discern congressional intent on a particular issue involves a
court first examining its text, and looking elsewhere only if an
ambiguity in the language exists.es If such an ambiguity is
found, the court then turns to the statute's legislative history.89
In the absence of meaningful legislative history, the court ex-
amines relevant public policy concerns in an effort to deter-
mine the enacting legislature's intent90 Applying this
paradigm analysis to CERCLA private party attorney fees dem-
onstrates the error in the General Electric analysis.
86. IL at 1422. In addition, the Eighth Circuit upheld the size of the
award, giving "great deference" to the district court's findings. Id. The Eighth
Circuit justified its deference on two grounds. First, the district court is gener-
ally best equipped to determine whether the hours charged reflect a proper to-
tal. Id. Second, the district court is better able to compare the claimed rate to
rates charged by attorneys for similar work in the immediate region. Id
(quoting Moore v. City of Des Moines, 766 F.2d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1060 (1986)).
87. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 267-91
(1975).
88. See W. EsxRuDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION 616-18 (1988); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1483 (1987). Eskridge posits, in regard to a recently enacted statute
such as CERCLA, that statutory text ought to control unless current historical
perspective indicates Congress did not consider the issue and present public
policy would strongly favor an alternative interpretation. Eskridge, supra, at
1497.
89. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1981). The
Griffin Court notes that "in rare cases the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters, and
those intentions must be controlling." I Frickey and Eskridge note the tradi-
tional rule, namely that extrinsic aids such as legislative history should only
be considered if the language of the statute is ambiguous. W. ESKRIDGE & P.
FRICKEY, supra note 88, at 696-97.
90. See, e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 680-83 (1978)
(using "imaginative reconstruction" method to divine intent of the enacting
Congress). In recently enacted legislation, strong applicable social policies are
valuable insofar as they shed light on the motives of the enacting legislature.
See W. ESKRnGE & P. F RCKEY, supra note 88, at 607-10, 616-17.
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A. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 101(25)
Section 107 authorizes both EPA and private party cost re-
covery actions 1 Specifically, section 107(a)(4)(B) allows pri-
vate parties to recover their "necessary response costs."92
Section 101(25) defines "response costs" to include "enforce-
ment activities."93 Because of its location in the early defini-
tions section of CERCLA, section 101(25) presumptively applies
to the entire act;94 therefore, it must necessarily apply to sec-
tion 107.95
The pivotal issue, therefore, becomes whether private par-
ties can engage in enforcement activities, as contemplated by
CERCLA. If enforcement activities are limited, by definition,
to government entities, any provision of CERCLA that deals
with enforcement activities is inapplicable to private party
plaintiffs.96 Because the Act does not explicitly define "en-
forcement activities,"97 an examination of the relevant legisla-
tive history is necessary.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress added the phrase "enforcement activities" to the
definition of "response costs" in the 1986 amendments.98 Un-
fortunately, the legislative history explaining Congress's intent
in this change to section 101(25) is sparse.
1. House Report
The report of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce ("House Report") on H.R. 2817, one of two competing
bills drafted to amend CERCLA, notes that the addition of "en-
forcement activities" to the definition of response costs "will
confirm EPA's authority to recover costs for enforcement ac-
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988).
92. I § 9607(a)(4)(B).
93. Id. § 9601(25).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988) is entitled "Definitions," and defines its terms
"[flor the purposes of this subchapter.. . ." Id.
95. Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 950-51
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
96. See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 n.13
(D.N.J. 1988). For example, suppose only x-type people pay y-type taxes. Any
law effecting an increase in y-type taxes will only affect x-type people, be-
cause, obviously, they are the only people who pay y-type taxes.
97. CERCLA fails to define "enforcement activities." See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988).
98. Pease & Curren, 744 F. Supp. at 951.
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tions taken against responsible parties."99 Litton argued that
the House Report's failure to mention private parties suggests
by negative implication that section 101(25) relates only to the
EPA's cost recovery efforts.1 ° Although no such comments
about the addition of "enforcement activities" appear in the re-
ports appended to H.R. 2005, the bill that eventually passed,' 0 '
the proposed language of section 101(25) was the same in both
bills.10 2 The remarks, therefore, have considerable probative
weight. 0 3 Thus, because the only legislative history mention-
ing the amendment to section 101(25) and its effect on attorney
fees discusses only the EPA's authority to recover such fees, it
suggests that section 101(25) does not authorize private parties
to recover attorney fees.i ° 4
2. Conference Report
The only legislative history that directly addresses the cur-
rent statutory language is the Conference Committee Report
("Conference Report"). 0 5 The Conference Report observes
that section 101(25) "confirms that such costs [response costs
generally] are recoverable from responsible parties, as removal
99. H.R. REP., supra note 12, pt. 1, at 66, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2848-49. The report reads: 'This section also modi-
fies the definition of 'response action' to include related enforcement activities.
The change will confirm the EPA's authority to recover costs for enforcement
actions taken against responsible parties." Id.
100. See Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, slip. op. at 6 (E.D.
Pa Apr. 23, 1990).
101. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3276 [hereinafter H.R. CONF REP.].
102. H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 11,619, 11,620-21 (1985);
H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 101, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3278. The Conference Report discusses the alternative proposals for
the text of § 101(25), and notes that the House version was adopted, and does
not differentiate between the competing House versions. Id. It does distin-
guish the Senate version, which was dropped. Id.
103. See, eg., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1977) (noting that when
"Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress
normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given
to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute").
104. This reading of the legislative history is inspired by the maxim of stat-
utory construction erpressio unius est exclusio alterius - "inclusion of one
thing indicates exclusion of the other." W. ESKRiDGE & P. FRICKEY, s-upra
note 88, at 641. For an example of the use of this maxim in a case, see Tate v.
Ogg, 170 Va. 95, 95, 195 S.E. 496, 496 (1938) (statute regulating "any horse,
mule, cattle, hog, sheep or goat" did not cover turkeys).
105. H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 101, at 185, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEws at 3278.
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or remedial costs under section 107."106 The Conference Report
makes no distinction between government and private party
plaintiffs.
The Conference Report's failure to distinguish between
government and private party plaintiffs, however, is not dispos-
itive. If only government agencies can engage in enforcement
actions and private parties cannot, the Conference Report
would not have addressed the issue; rather, the Conference
Committee may have assumed that the phrase "enforcement
activities" was self-explanatory.10 7 As such, any reference to
enforcement actions would obviously apply only to the govern-
ment, in the same sense that automobile owner registration re-
quirements apply only to people who own automobiles.
Using this analysis, defendant Litton argued that a private
plaintiff may not recover attorney fees under CERCLA unes
she first shows that she engaged in "enforcement activities"
within the meaning of the statute. A private cost-recovery ac-
tion is not an enforcement action under CERCLA, Litton con-
tinued, and thus, private parties do not incur "enforcement
costs" as contemplated by CERCLA. 08 In response, GE argued
that private cost-recovery actions are simply private sector en-
forcement of CERCLA's goals.109 Government action compel-
ling a defendant to reimburse it for response costs constitutes
enforcement; a private party's cost recovery action serves the
106. Id.
107. For example, some courts awarding attorney fees have based their in-
terpretation upon a plain meaning reading of the statute. See General Elec.
Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991); Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
108. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 47 n.35, General Elec. Co. v. Litton In-
dus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2845), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991); see also Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-
8644, slip. op. at 6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database)
(adopting the same argument); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F.
Supp. 696, 707 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that Congress only intended the govern-
ment to recover attorney fees for "enforcement activities").
109. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 47 n.35, General Elec. (No. 89-2845); ac-
cord Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Por-
tions of the First Amended Complaint at 15, Pease & Curren (No. 89-4468)
[hereinafter Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion, Pease & Curren].
'"The term 'enforcement activities' found in the definition of response is not
limited on the face of the statute to CERCLA actions brought by the federal
government, it applies equally to private party enforcement of CERCLA."
Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion at 15, Pease & Curren (No. 89-4468).
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same purpose, and hence, should be treated as enforcement." 0
The Eighth Circuit agreed with GE, citing two cases in
which the Ninth Circuit characterized private cost recovery ac-
tions as private party "enforcement" of CERCLA. n The Gen-
eral Electric court relied on Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc. -2 and Cadillac/Fairview v. Dow Chemical Co.," 3 to sup-
port the proposition that private cost'recovery actions are "pri-
vate enforcement" of CERCLA.114 Upon closer examination,
however, these cases are not strong precedent for determining
that Congress intended "enforcement" to include private party
action." 5 Wickland Oil makes a wholly unsupported state-
110. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 47 n.35, General Elec (No. 89-2845). GE
argued that-
GE invoked CERCLA in precisely the same way EPA does when it
seeks to collect CERCLA response costs. Since the government's ac-
tion in compelling a responsible party to reimburse it for response
costs constitutes 'enforcement,' a private party's action in doing pre-
cisely the same thing under the same statute can hardly be something
else.
111. Plaintiffs frequently cite Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792
F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986). The Wickland court held that one of the central pur-
poses of CERCLA is to promote the "effectiveness of private enforcement ac-
tions under section 107(a) as a remedy independent of government actions
financed by Superfund." I at 892.
112. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
113. 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988).
114. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1422 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Cadillac/Fairview, 840 F.2d at 691; Wickland Oil
Terminals, 792 F.2d at 892), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
115. Words have many meanings, and the plain or colloquial meaning of a
particular word may differ from the meaning Congress intended to apply re-
garding the statute. See, ag., Federal Land Bank v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d
764, 769 (8th Cir. 1989) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (noting that "it makes no
sense to transplant... common-law doctrine... [to a case involving] not...
common-law doctrines but... statutory interpretation"). In other words, the
court might find that a private party is simply attempting to enforce its rights
under the CERCLA statute. The government, by contrast, acts in a far more
comprehensive manner in directing cleanups, setting standards, and monitor-
ing community involvement - all of which entail a larger enforcement role
than private plaintiffs can effectuate.
An examination of the plain and the legal meaning of "enforcement" in
CERCLA § 101(25) demonstrates the contrast. Webster's defines "enforce-
ment" as "compulsion .... forcible urging or argument... ; the compelling of
the fulfillment (as of a law or order) .... ." WEBSTER's THRD NEw INTERNA-
TIONAL DIcrIoNARY 751 (1976). Black's Law Dictionary defines "enforcement"
as "[t]he act of putting something such as a law into effect; the execution of a
law;, the carrying out of a mandate or a command." BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY
474 (5th ed. 1979). Although one private party can compel another to perform
certain acts in a plain language sense, a private party is utterly powerless to
legally compel another private party to do anything without the assistance of
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ment regarding "private enforcement" of CERCLA; Cadil-
lac/Fairview simply cites Wickland Oil verbatim." 6 As Litton
argued correctly, neither of these cases involved the attorney
fees issue; consequently, the Eighth Circuit relied upon poor
precedent.117 Moreover, the General Electric court ignored
other precedent holding that private parties cannot engage in
"enforcement activities." 118
3. Government and Private Party Roles Contrasted
Given the lack of clarity in the House and Conference Re-
ports, it may be helpful to examine the role of the government
and private parties under CERCLA. Government enforcement
under CERCLA may involve monitoring, compliance orders
and a host of other activities short of legal action that nonethe-
less are costly and for which the government should be reim-
bursed." 9 For example, the government may have to relocate
people threatened by toxic releases and bring criminal actions
against, polluters. 20 In contrast, private parties may bring an
action to recover response costs already incurred but cannot
bring an action to "enforce" CERCLA's provisions against an-
other private party.121 Private plaintiffs simply hire a waste re-
moval contractor to perform the clean up.'22 The much
broader enforcement responsibility of the government suggests
that the phrase "enforcement activities" pertains more appro-
judicial process. Significantly, the EPA can compel a private party to act
under other sections of the CERCLA statute. The court in Sisters of the Holy
Cross v. Brookline, 347 Mass. 486, 198 N.E.2d 624 (1964), noted that "[tihe ordi-
nary meaning of 'enforce' is 'to compel obedience to,' 'to cause to be exe-
cuted."' Id. at 491, 198 N.E.2d at 628 (citing Larson v. New England Tel. &
Tel. Co., 141 Me. 326, 337, 44 A.2d 1, 7 (1945)).
116. Cadillac/Fairview, 840 F.2d at 694; Wickland Oil Terminals, 792 F.2d
at 892.
117. Petition for Certiorari at 18 n.21, General Elec. v. Litton Indus. Auto-
mation Sys., Inc., 920 F. 2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-1221), cert denied, 111
S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
118. Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, slip. op. at 6 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 23, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety
Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 709 (D.N.J. 1988).
119. See T & E Indus, 680 F. Supp. at 708 n.13.
120. See F. GRAD, supra note 37, § 4A.02(c) (discussing unique congres-
sional grant of authority to the President under CERCLA to take various
emergency measures to protect national health).
121. T & E Indus., 680 F. Supp. at 708 n.13.
122. See Baker & Markoff, By-Products Liability: Using Common Law
Private Actions to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 10 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 99,
100-02 (1986) (contrasting typical government and private party cleanups
under CERCLA).
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priately to government plaintiffs, rather than to private party
plaintiffs.
4. Legislative Silence
In three relatively minor CERCLA provisions, Congress
explicitly allowed attorney fees for private parties. As part of
the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, for example, Congress
placed a phrase in section 310 allowing attorney fee awards in
citizen suits.'m Congress also provided for attorney fees in sec-
tion 110(c), a provision designed to enable financially out-
matched whistleblowing employees of polluting companies to
bring suit.124 Congress provided for awards of attorney fees a
third time in section 112(c)(3), a provision that allows the At-
torney General to recover fees incurred in replenishing
Superfund payouts.'2 Because Congress explicitly provided for
attorney fee awards in three sections of CERCLA, its failure to
do so in section 101(25) may suggest that it did not intend pri-
vate parties to collect- attorney fees in cost recovery actions.
Further, section 107 is the greatest source of attorney fees in
the statute;1 26 the lack of an explicit provision in that section,
therefore, is even more suggestive that Congress did not intend
private parties to receive attorney fees. Although congressional
silence alone is not dispositive, 2 7 it seems unlikely that Con-
gress would specifically allow private parties to recover attor-
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988).
124. CERCLA § 310(c) provides, in pertinent part
Whenever an employee brings an application to the Secretary of La-
bor for the alleged discriminatory practices of an employer with re-
spect to a discharge... and an order issues in applicant's favor, the
prevailing applicant shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee
from the violator, if the applicant so requests and as determined by
the Secretary of Labor.
42 U.S.C. § 9610(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
125. CERCLA § 112(c)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
Upon the request of the President, the Attorney General shall com-
mence an action on behalf of the Fund to recover any compensation
paid by the Fund to any claimant pursuant to this title ... and, with-
out regard to any limitation of liability, all interest, administrative
and adjudicative costs, and attorney's fees incurred by the Fund by
reason of the claim.
42 U.S.C. § 9612(c)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
126. Remember that "corporate America's potential liability for some
22,000 waste sites could eventually exceed $100 billion." N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1988, at 22, col. 2. As the government only cleans up a small percentage of
these sites, the remainder must be cleaned up by private parties. Baker &
Markoff, supra note 122, at 100-01.
127. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 88, at 772-74.
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ney fees in these three minor provisions of CERCLA.'m
The General Electric court only cursorily considered legis-
lative history in resolving the attorney fees issue. It neglected,
for example, to address Congress's failure to specify private
party attorney fee awards in section 107. Likewise, it did not
consider the legislative history of the amended section
101(25).' -  Rather, it justified its holding that private parties
could engage in enforcement activities130 by focusing on ques-
tionable precedent' 31 and broader policy arguments. L3 2
C. AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO PLAINTIFFS WOULD NOT
SERVE CERCLA's "BROAD REMEDIAL PURPOSES:"
How COURTS SHOULD WEIGH OUTCOME-
DETERMINATIVE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Courts cannot discern congressional intent regarding pri-
vate party attorney fees from a "plain language" reading of
CERCLA.133 Consequently, courts interpreting the statute
should continue to examine its legislative history; this history
implies that Congress did not intend private party fee recovery,
but fails to resolve the issue.'34 Thus, courts must turn to pol-
icy rationales and weigh these considerations to determine con-
gressional intent.1'
In analyzing public policy considerations, the General Elec-
tric court based its holding in part on the policy ground that
awarding attorney fees would serve CERCLA's beneficial re-
medial purposes.13 After Alyeska, however, courts should con-
sider such policy arguments only to the extent that they
suggest Congress intended to allow plaintiffs to recover attor-
ney fees. 3 7 Alyeska precludes any argument that the courts
should fashion an exception to the American Rule based on a
"private attorney general" theory.13s Although Alyeska does
not preclude policy arguments, it does require a court to relate
128. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
136. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d
1415, 1422, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
137. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,269-71
(1975).
138. See Comment, Awarding Attorney's Fees to Environmental Plaintiffs
1562 [Vol. 75:1541
CERCLA ATTORNEY FEES
those policies to legislative intent.'3
A strict interpretation of Alyeska would mandate a denial
of attorney fees.140 In this case, the statutory language is am-
biguous;14 the legislative history unclear and largely silent,1'
and the judicial interpretations of the issue divided.14 3 Aly-
eska, however, need not be read so strictly. Even under Aly-
eska, courts should take a searching look at the policies that
Congress intended to effectuate in passing CERCLA and assess
if awarding attorney fees in private cost recovery actions would
further these policies.1' This approach does not usurp the leg-
islative function and advocate the awarding of attorney fees for
policy reasons alone, without statutory authorization. 1' It at-
tempts merely to determine if awarding attorney fees would
serve CERCLA's remedial purposes, reduce delay by defend-
ants, and enable impoverished plaintiffs to bring suit.'4 Courts
also should examine the effect of awarding attorney fees upon
Under a Private Attorney General Theory, 14 B.C. ENv. AFFAIRS L. REV. 287,
289 (1986).
139. The Alyeska opinion notes that Congress, while "fully recognizing and
accepting the general rule [American Rule], has made specific and explicit pro-
visions for the allowance of attorneys' fees under selected statutes granting or
protecting various federal rights." 421 U.S. at 260. The preceding quote can be
interpreted as the Court prohibiting an award of attorney fees unless the pro-
vision explicitly mentions them by name. This interpretation would obviously
prohibit CERCLA private cost recovery action plaintiffs from recovering attor-
ney fees.
However, Alyeslca reflects a judicial deference towards congressional in-
tent regarding attorney fees issues. Alyeska specifically recognizes the right of
Congress to carve out exceptions to the American Rule at will. Id. at 260-61.
Consequently, congressional intent predominates. Thus, given an ambiguous
statute, the Alyeska opinion could also be interpreted as directing a court to
search further to determine and follow legislative intent. Id
140. See supra note 139; see also United States v. American Trucking Ass'n,
310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (discussing the "plain meaning" rule, and its corollary,
the "absurd result" exception to the Rule). The strict "literalist" or "plain
meaning" approach enjoyed widespread popularity at the turn of the century
and has received recent life from recent politically conservative appointees to
the federal bench. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 88, at 591-97.
Commentators criticize the "plain meaning" rule as oversimplified and subject
to manipulation. See generally Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legisla-
tive History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 195-99
(1983) (discussing shortcomings of "plain meaning" rule in statutory
interpretation).
141. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 137-40.
145. Id.
146. See infra notes 152-79 and accompanying text.
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the existing balance of power between CERCLA plaintiffs and
defendants, keeping in mind the balance Congress intended to
strike.147 After compiling the policy implications, the final in-
quiry would involve assessing the extent to which such consid-
erations increase the likelihood that Congress intended to allow
awards of attorney fees under the rubric of "response costs."'14
General Electric argued successfully that an award of at-
torney fees to victorious private plaintiffs would further CER-
CLA's broad purposes as a remedial statute,149 and supported
its contention with two policy arguments. First, General Elec-
tric argued that because attorney fees in CERCLA cases can be
enormous, a denial of awards would have a "chilling effet" on
plaintiff suits.150 Further, absent the threat of an attorney fees
award, CERCLA defendants will attempt to increase the plain-
tiffs' litigation costs, secure in the knowledge that, at worst, all
the defendant will have to pay for is the cost of the cleanup.' 5 '
147. I&
148. Id.
149. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991). The Eighth Circuit
noted that its conclusion "based on the statutory language is consistent with
two of the main purposes of CERCLA - prompt cleanup of hazardous waste
sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party." Id.
150. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 45-46, General Elec. Co. v. Litton In-
dus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2845), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991). Congress also recognized the importance of
awarding fees in private attorney general actions when it passed the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The
Senate Report, which accompanied the Act, stated that fee shifting is "an inte-
gral remedy necessary to achieve compliance with our statutory policies." See
SEN. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5908-10 (1976) (stating that the rationale behind the passage of
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 is that awarding fees is
vital to private actions). The Report noted that in "many cases the citizen who
must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a law-
yer." Id.; see also Larson, Current Proposals in Congress to Limit and to Bar
Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L,
& Soc. CHANGE 523, 533-38 (1986) (elaborating on rationale given by Congress
for passing fee-shifting statutes). See generally Leubsdorf, Toward a History
of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS.
9, 32 (1984) (noting that "[t]he message... may be that Congress is now will-
ing to award fees to a relatively poor party who prevails against a wealthy in-
stitutional litigant").
151. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 46, General Elem (No. 89-2845); ac-
cord Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1978). For a
comprehensive discussion, see Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee
Shifting, 47 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS. 139, 150-53 (1984) (discussing effect of
attorney fee awards in discouraging nuisance suits by plaintiffs brought in
hopes that defendant's attorney fees exceed the amount plaintiffs will accept
to settle their claim). Here, CERCLA plaintiffs use the argument in reverse.
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None of these arguments, however, is compelling enough to
overcome the negative implication regarding attorney fees that
the absence of explicit statutory authorization creates.
1. No Chilling Effect Shown
The three CERCLA sections with explicit attorney fee pro-
visions all protect defenseless plaintiffs whose actions create a
public benefit. Section 310 applies to citizen suits brought to
compel the EPA administrator to perform his duties under the
statute and serve a codified "private attorney general" pur-
pose.152 Section 110(c) applies to complaints filed by an em-
ployee against a polluting employer.153  As with
"whistleblower" provisions in other statutes, 54 Congress meant
to encourage such suits in the public interest as well as assist an
overmatched single employee battling a corporation.155 Signifi-
cantly, section 110 is entitled "Employee Protection."'15 Lastly,
section 112(c)(3), which authorizes attorney fee recovery by the
Attorney General to replenish the Hazardous Substances Trust
Fund 57 simply demonstrates congressional intent to reimburse
the government, not a private party. The policy reasons behind
these explicit fee clauses seem completely inapposite in the
General Electric context. In General Electric, two large private
corporations were the parties. Indeed, GE and Litton Indus-
tries are both "Fortune 500" corporations. 53
In addition, CERCLA private cost recovery plaintiffs like
GE would not be precluded from bringing suit if they had to
pay their own legal fees. In civil rights actions, the absence of
an attorney fees provision significantly deters indigent but de-
serving plaintiffs from bringing claims with competent coun-
sel.159 In contrast, plaintiffs in CERCLA cost recovery actions,
by and large, are industrial corporations for whom the absence
of a provision to recover attorney fees would not affect the de-
cision to sue.16° Although attorney fees often are significant in
152. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 124 (quoting language of the statute).
154. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1206-08, 2302, 7121 (1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A,
§§ 12G-12K (1980); see also Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in
the Federal Executive Branch, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 615, 615-20 (discussing mo-
tives behind congressional passage of whistleblower provisions).
155. Id.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1988).
157. See supra note 40.
158. The Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 22, 1991, at 286.
159. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
160. Telephone interview with Sheryl Auerbach, Dilworth, Paxson, Ka]ish
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CERCLA actions, a review of plaintiffs' briefs in three recent
major cases reveals none in which counsel argued that the suit
could not be brought absent an attorney fees provision.161
Moreover, the availability or lack of an opportunity to re-
cover attorney fees has not produced a "chilling effect" on most
private plaintiffs' ability to file suit. The total number of cost
recovery actions filed has increased since 1988.162 Attorneys
have noted a growing awareness on the part of potential indus-
trial plaintiffs regarding the availability of environmental law
remedies.163 Thus, the presence or absence of a fee recovery
provision does not seem crucial to the typical CERCLA plain-
tiff's ability to file or prosecute a lawsuit.
Contrary to GE's assertions, awarding attorney fees may
have the reverse effect of chilling potentially legitimate claims
by defendants that the statutory scheme intended them to as-
sert,1as such as the enumerated defenses to liability. 6 5 Defend-
& Kauffman, attorney for defendant Litton (May 10, 1991) [hereinafter
Auerbach interview]. Attorney Auerbach noted that many CERCLA plaintiffs
in cost recovery actions are corporations. I. Auerbach noted further that
since many actions involve an industrial site where pollutants have been
dumped in earlier years, the buyer, the seller, and the polluter (if different)
are often corporate entities. Id. Defendants assert in most of their briefs that
CERCLA's remedial purposes do not extend to rewarding calculating corpora-
tions. In General Electric, plaintiffs' legal fees, which plaintiffs supported with
"conclusory affidavits and summary billings," amounted to three times defend-
ants' billing. Appellant's Brief at 45, General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Auto-
mation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2845), cert denied, 111
S. Ct. 1697 (1991). Nonetheless, the United States District Court awarded
plaintiffs all claimed fees, which amounted to $311,928.32. Id.
161. See Appellant's Brief, General Elec. (No. 89-2845); Defendant's Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities, Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab,
Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 89-4468); Reply Brief of Defendants,
Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, No. 89-8644, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990).
162. See Hazardous Waste Prompts Lawsuit From Partnership, San Fran-
cisco Bus. Times, Feb. 15,1991, § 1, at 4; Environmen4 Energy and Safety Out-
look '89, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Jan. 26, 1991; Auerbach
interview, supra note 160.
163. See Clark, How to Survive in the Environmental Jungle, INsTrrU-
TIONAL INv_ ToRs, Dec. 1990, at 89 (discussing the need for corporate execu-
tives to be aware of environmental hazards and remedies); see also Legal
Business Booming, Business Journal-San Jose, Dec. 28,1987, § 2, at 12 (discuss-
ing increasing sophistication of businesses regarding environmental matters).
164. See supra note 75. See generally Note, Financial Barriers to Litiga-
tion: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALBANY L. REV. 148,
165-67 (1981) (noting that the "central premise of the English fee system (win-
ner awarded attorney fees) is that the wrongdoer should bear the costs of liti-
gation to assure that the innocent party does not always prevail). Proponents
of fee shifting would counter that the wrongdoer is usually the losing litigant
Id at 165. However, indigent litigants "are the most likely victims of incorrect
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ants probably will forego litigating claims offering less than a
guaranteed promise of success for fear that if they lose, they
will be forced to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees as well as
their own.166 Likewise, awarding fees would tip the balance in
favor of coercive settlements for the benefit of plaintiffs.167
An eagerness to award attorney fees might also encourage
plaintiffs either to incur excessive legal costs or to exaggerate
actual expenses.168 Indeed, in two cases in which the courts
awarded attorney fees, the courts have made a specific reduc-
tion of the amount claimed by plaintiffs to ensure that the at-
torney fees were truly necessary costs of response. In one case,
the court trimmed excessive transportation expenses that an at-
torney incurred absent any proof of their necessity.169 In the
other action, the court had to reduce the billing rates of two of
decisions, particularly when they face wealthy opponents with vastly superior
legal resources." Id For a civil rights example, of the cases brought through
1935 to challenge desegregation, the NAACP lost 44 cases out of 44 attempts.
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JusncE 169 (1976).
165. See supra note 75.
166. See infra note 167. In their haste to condemn the depredations of
toxic polluters, courts should not forget that a certain percentage are innocent
landowners, or culpable of only a small, divisible, and readily severable por-
tion of the total harm.
167. For a detailed discussion on the effect of attorney fee awards on settle-
ment, see Rowe, supra note 151, at 154-70. Attorney fee awards have a double
effect on the settlement process. Defendant is usually willing to offer more
than she would have in the absence of fee shifting, likewise, plaintiff may also
feel she can ask for more. Id at 155. Additionally, the effect of risk aversion
increases with the prospective cost of a negative outcome. Id. at 156. The com-
bined effect of these three factors increases the likelihood for settlement on
more adverse terms to the defendant. I& at 157-58; see also Shavell, Sui; Set-
tlemen and Tria" A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the
Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUDIES 55, 68-69 (1982) (discussing ef-
fects on likelihood of settlement under the English rule (two-way shifting),
one-way shifting, and the American rule).
168. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). In addition to the
potential unfairness of attorney fee awards, their existence stimulates litiga-
tion over the amount of the awards, which has been universally condemned as
wasteful. See Larson, supra note 150, at 540; see also Coffee, Rescuing the Pri-
vate Attorney Genera: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 219 n.10 (1983). Coffee quotes an unnamed fed-
eral judge as saying, "[d]uring the One Hundred Years War, Europe was
nearly brought to its knees by roving bands of mercenaries who pillaged and
robbed and left a barren landscape in their wake. The modern equivalent of
these mercenaries is the plaintiff's attorney." I&
169. BCW Assocs. v. Occidental Chem., No. 86-5947, slip op. at 15 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 29, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database). The United States District
Court awarded one plaintiff $30,422.71 in attorney fees, deducting $1,052.00 in
expenses claimed for an air taxi fare for one attorney. Id. The court held that
the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the charge was necessary. Id.
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the plaintiffs' attorneys to the level of local legal rates. 70
Faced with numerous awards of attorney fees in CERCLA
cases, however, courts' antipathy towards additional burdens
may cause them simply to accept plaintiffs' tabulations. Scar-
city of time, coupled with a limited ability to scour expenses,
could reduce courts' effectiveness in monitoring fee requests
and result in the imposition of unfair burdens upon losing
CERCLA defendants.
2. Unnecessary Delay
GE and other CERCLA plaintiffs argue that failing to
award attorney fees encourages defendants to unnecessarily de-
lay in litigation. Courts should reject this argument. If this ar-
gument were credible, plaintiffs should be able to produce
evidence of dilatory tactics by defendants in virtually every pri-
vate cost recovery action. Because courts have split on the at-
torney fee issue, defendants in such actions can always argue a
good faith belief that attorney fees are not awardable, and, if
nothing more, litigate that single issue.'7 1 There is, however,
no evidence of such behavior. 172 Furthermore, courts should
not use a CERCLA provision to prevent defendants from using
dilatory tactics when Rule 11 exists for this very purpose. 73
CERCLA defendants, on the other hand, frequently argue
170. See General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949,
963 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd sub. nom General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Auto-
mation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697
(1991). Plaintiff requested attorney's fees for 2,663.03 hours expended by part-
ners, associates, of counsel attorneys, legal assistants, law clerks, and law li-
brarians. Id- The court approved the hours listed as reasonable. Id. The
hourly rates claimed by plaintiff varied from $25 per hour for an assistant li-
brarian to $195 per hour for a partner. Id. The court found the partner's rate
excessive and reduced it to $135 to better comport with rates in the Spring-
field, Missouri area. Id.
171. Before the Eighth Circuit's General Electric decision was issued in De-
cember, 1990, the existence of the split among the federal district courts per-
mitted every defendant to freely contest any award of attorney fees to a
successful plaintiff. Most did, and the resulting litany of cases should provide
CERCLA plaintiffs with innumerable instances of dilatory tactics on the part
of defendants.
172. In not one of the 11 cases discussed above dealing with attorney fees in
private cost recovery actions against CERCLA has the court awarded sanctions
to the plaintiff for the conduct of the defendant. See supra notes 50-51 (for
full citation of all cases on the topic).
173. FED. 1. Civ. P. 11; see Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Stan-
dards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 632-44 (1983). The Note
discusses the effect of the 1983 amendments to Rule 11. Id. at 632. The new
rule imposes an affirmative obligation on the attorney to conduct prefiling in-
[Vol. 75:15411568
CERCLA ATTORNEY FEES
that allowing plaintiffs to recover attorney fees would en-
courage plaintiffs to bring garden variety tort claims disguised
as CERCLA claims.' 74 Courts should likewise reject this asser-
tion. As one court noted, allowing a plaintiff to recover attor-
ney fees for a CERCLA claim does not automatically allow it to
recover for every count in its entire complaint.175 The court
then held that fees could be allocated to reflect attorney time
spent on distinct parts of the complaint.176
D. GENERAL ELECr ic REVISITED
In General Electric, the Eighth Circuit claimed to rest its
decision on the amended language of the CERCLA statute,177
but the General Electric decision was motivated by an equitable
desire to force the rapid clean up of toxic dumpsites, even at
the potential price of unfairly penalizing defendants. 178 In find-
ing that CERCLA allows the awarding of attorney fees to pre-
vailing private litigants, the court ignored conflicting readings
of the statutory language and opposing policy arguments.179
Future courts can reach a more appropriate result through the
consideration of a broader range of plausible statutory interpre-
tations and policy arguments to better divine the intent of Con-
gress in drafting CERCLA's statutory language. Given the
explicit provisions for attorney fees awards elsewhere in CER-
CLA' 8 0 and the absence of any compelling policy arguments to
overcome the effect of legislative silence,' 8 ' courts should de-
quiries into relevant facts and law. Id. at 633. Additionally, the new Rule 11
does not limit the motives a court can consider improper. Id.
Litigants have enthusiastically invoked the new Rule. From 1938 to 1976,
only 19 reported cases invoked the old Rule 11, and only three of these re-
sulted in judicial sanctions. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its En-force-
ment Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61
MiNN. L. REv. 1, 34-37 (1976). In contrast, from the adoption of the Rule 11
amendments on August 1, 1983, to August 1, 1985, more than 200 cases in-
volved the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Nelkin, Sanctions Under Amended
Fed. 1R Civ. P. 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Com-
pensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1326 (1986). The new Rule 11
places a definite limit on oppressive attorney conduct.
174. Pease & Curren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 952
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 133-76 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 133-76 and accompanying text.
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mand explicit congressional authorization before awarding at-
torney fees to private plaintiffs under the statute.
CONCLUSION
In General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation
Systems, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a successful
plaintiff in a CERCLA private cost recovery action could re-
cover attorney fees.18 2 The court's decision to allow such
awards reflects a public policy that encourages courts to force
industrial polluters to bear the entire cost of their conduct. On
a practical level, the decision represents a significant victory for
CERCLA plaintiffs, and a correspondingly great shift in the
balance against CERCLA defendants in cost recovery actions.
General Electric undoubtedly will spawn more speedy and ad-
vantageous settlements for private CERCLA plaintiffs.183
On March 26, 1991, the Supreme Court declined to hear
General Electric.184 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit opinion
continues to influence all federal district courts hearing private
cost recovery actions. The majority of winning plaintiffs will
henceforth recover attorney fees. Hopefully, another circuit
will reach a different result that better serves congressional in-
tent as indicated by CERCLA's language, statutory history, and
public policy. Until this indefinite point in the future, plaintiffs
shall continue to reap a windfall and force defendants to settle
or risk huge losses.
Kanad S. Virk
182. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
184. General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1422 (8th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
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